The idea that consciousness and complexity are closely related has been a major driver of the popularity of integrated information theory of consciousness, despite its major formal, phenomenological, and neuroscientific shortcomings. Here, I argue that we can recover this intuition by replacing its biologically neutral notion of complexity with an evolutionary one that I shall dub “pathological complexity.”.

Views from one of the most original cultural critics of the twentieth century, Walter Benjamin.

"Local History/Global Designs" is one of the most important books in the historical humanities to have emerged since the end of the Cold War University. This is vintage Mignolo: packed with insights, breadth, and intellectual zeal.

Benenson et al. provide a compelling case for treating greater investment into self-protection among females as an adaptive strategy. Here, we wish to expand their proposed adaptive explanation by placing it squarely in modern state-based and behavioural life-history theory, drawing on Veit'spathological complexityframework. This allows us to make sense of alternative “lifestyle” strategies, rather than pathologizing them.

Renaissance logician, philosopher, humanist, and teacher, Peter Ramus (1515-72) is best known for his attack on Aristotelian logic, his radical pedagogical theories, and his new interpretation for the canon of rhetoric. His work, published in Latin and translated into many languages, has influenced the study of Renaissance literature, rhetoric, education, logic, and--more recently--media studies. Considered the most important work of Walter Ong's career, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue is an elegant review of the history of Ramist scholarship (...) and Ramus's quarrels with Aristotle. A key influence on Marshall McLuhan, with whom Ong enjoys the status of honorary guru among technophiles, this challenging study remains the most detailed account of Ramus's method ever published. Out of print for more than a decade, this book--with a new foreword by Adrian Johns--is a canonical text for enthusiasts of media, Renaissance literature, and intellectual history. (shrink)

Ladyman and Ross argue that quantum objects are not individuals and use this idea to ground their metaphysical view, ontic structural realism, according to which relational structures are primary to things. LR acknowledge that there is a version of quantum theory, namely the Bohm theory, according to which particles do have denite trajectories at all times. However, LR interpret the research by Brown et al. as implying that "raw stuff" or haecceities are needed for the individuality of particles of BT, (...) and LR dismiss this as idle metaphysics. In this paper we note that Brown et al.'s research does not imply that haecceities are needed. Thus BT remains as a genuine option for those who seek to understand quantum particles as individuals. However, we go on to discuss some problems with BT which led Bohm and Hiley to modify it. This modified version underlines that, due to features such as context-dependence and non-locality, Bohmian particles have a very limited autonomy in situations where quantum effects are non-negligible. So while BT restores the possibility of quantum individuals, it also underlines the primacy of the whole over the autonomy of the parts. The later sections of the paper also examine the Bohm theory in the general mathematical context of symplectic geometry. This provides yet another way of understanding the subtle, holistic and dynamic nature of Bohmian individuals. We finally briefly consider Bohm's other main line of research, the "implicate order", which is in some ways similar to LR's structural realism. (shrink)

Argument for the role of the human conscience in determining right and wrong, good and evil.

Mental causation, our mind's ability to causally affect the course of the world, is part and parcel of our ‘manifest image’ of the world. That there is mental causation is denied by virtually no one. How there can be such a thing as mental causation, however, is far from obvious. In recent years, discussions about the problem of mental causation have focused on Jaegwon Kim's so-called Causal Exclusion Argument, according to which mental events are ‘screened off’ or ‘preempted’ by physical (...) events unless mental causation is a genuine case of overdetermination or mental properties are straightforwardly reducible to physical properties. (shrink)

Diphtheria is an acute toxin-mediated superficial infection of the respiratory tract or skin caused by the aerobic gram-positive bacillus Corynebacterium diphtheriae. The epidemiology of infection and clinical manifestations of the disease vary in different parts of the world. Historical accounts of diphtheria epidemics have been described in many parts of the world since antiquity. Developed in the late 19th century, the diphtheria antitoxin played a pivotal role in the history of public health and vaccinology prior to the advent of the (...) diphtheria-tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis vaccine. One of the most significant demonstrations of the importance of DAT was its use in the 1925 diphtheria epidemic of Nome, Alaska. Coordinated emergency delivery of this life-saving antitoxin by dog-sled relay in the harshest of conditions has left a profound legacy in the annals of vaccinology and public health. Lead dogs Balto and Togo, and the dog-led antitoxin run of 1925 represent a dynamic illustration of the contribution made by non-human species towards mass immunization in the history of vaccinology. This unique example of cooperative interspecies fellowship and collaboration highlights the importance of the human-animal bond in the one-health initiative. (shrink)

L'etude menee par Walter Biemel ne pretend nullement isoler et epuiser un concept de la philosophie de Heidegger, mais s'attache tout au contraire a suggerer une interpretation originales d'une pensee a partir de l'un de ses concepts fondamentaux. Pour saisir le probleme du monde, il apparait en effet necessaire de comprendre la structure fondamentale du Dasein. Que la problematique du monde soit intimement liee a celle de l'Etre, c'est ce qui se manifeste clairement dans la definition que donne Heidegger (...) du Dasein, au troisieme chapitre de Sein und Zeit, comme etre-dans-le-monde. De la comprehension de cette modalite d'etre ve dependre la saisie adequate des elements structurels du Dasein. Walter Biemel releve l'importance de cette nouvelle facon de concevoir le Dasein et le changement qu'elle apporte par rapport a la conception traditionnelle partant de l'ego pur. L'expression etre-dans-le-monde, loin de se resumer a une constatation de fait, possede pour Heidegger la signification d'une these ontologique. Bien plus qu'une simple determination spatiale s'epuisant dans l'extensio cartesienne, il s'agit la d'une attitude de familiarite, qui se decline selon divers types de reference du Dasein au monde. Etre-dans-le-monde signifie au fond: etre ouvert a l'Etre, se trouver placer dans l'eclaircie de l'Etre. (shrink)

Gramsci, An italian marxist intellectual politically active when fascism rose and later imprisoned by mussolini, Offers a sensitive and non-Stereotyped communist interpretation of fascism. He rejected the crude "fascism as last stage of capitalism thesis," the view that it was merely the "agent of the big bourgeoisie" and even the view that it reflected a particular set of class interests. He recognized that it was not merely reactionary, That it had complex internal divisions, That it exemplified the "relative autonomy of (...) politics," and that it was best understood as a response to a "hegemonic crisis.". (shrink)

A translation of the main text for only published version J. G. Fichte's later WL. (Hitzig: Berlin 1810). It excludes Fichte's Preface.

von Walter Burkert ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Z 58.63-10.

Some philosophers have argued that the psychopath serves as the ultimate test of the limits of moral responsibility. They hold that the psychopath lacks a deep knowledge of right and wrong, and that Kant’s ethics arguably offers the most plausible account of this moral knowledge. On this view, the psychopath’s lack of moral understanding is due to a cognitive failure involving practical reason. I argue that the deep knowledge of right and wrong consists of emotional and volitional components in addition (...) to a cognitive one. Hence it is mistaken to claim that the psychopath’s moral deficiency is due solely to a cognitive failure, or that his lack of the deep knowledge of right and wrong can be explained entirely in terms of a defect of practical reason. I refer to empirical research to show that the Kantian model of practical reason does not provide a satisfactory account of responsibility of the psychopath in particular or of moral agents in general. On the basis of both philosophical and empirical considerations, I argue that the psychopath is at least partly responsible for his behaviour. (shrink)